Breaking Off From Close Combat -- Take #2

[Kevin Boylan]

It is not without some trepidation that I bring up this topic again. Yet, when -- as others advised -- I researched it, I discovered that my earlier posts were mistaken. Not only should all mounted be able to break off from all foot, but any element should be able to break off from any element!

I was initially surprised by this discovery myself, but the more I researched, the more obvious it became that it was true. Indeed, the most famous case of breaking off from combat in all military history -- the withdrawal of Hannibal’s center at Cannae -- would be impossible otherwise. One doesn’t have to dig very deep into ancient and medieval history to find lots of examples where troops retreated from combat with enemies capable of equal or faster movement. Evidently, it just wasn’t that difficult for troops engaged with the enemy to back up and the tactic was widely employed by commanders. It was probably the most popular order troops could receive!

Listed below are over a dozen historical examples that inform both the earlier discussion about knights and the new one concerning all element types’ ability to retreat from close combat. Many are famous incidents that will be familiar to most DBA players, but others are more obscure. The latter were chosen to illustrate the ubiquity of retreating from combat as a valid tactical option in different places and periods, and to demonstrate that troops did not have to be highly-trained or commanded by one of history’s great captains in order to employ it. Further research would, I’m sure, yield even more such examples.

Thermopylae (480 BCE): Herodotus describes Spartan hoplites deliberately backing up before the Immortals (Pavise) in order to draw the Persians into a trap.

Sphacteria (425 BCE): Spartan hoplites made a fighting withdrawal of several miles while being harassed by Athenian peltasts (Psiloi) who took it in turns to keep them under constant attack. Though suffering a steady drain of casualties, the Spartans made it back to their camp -- where they were later besieged, surprised, and forced to surrender.

Anabasis (401 BCE): Xenophon’s 10,000 make an epic fighting withdrawal over hundreds of miles punctuated by many small engagements in which they had to break off from combat with enemies that were generally faster in order to make their escape.

Cannae (216 BCE): Hannibal famously orders his Gallic (Warband) and Spanish allies (Spear) to make a fighting retreat designed to sucker the Romans (Blade) into history’s most renowned encirclement.

Zama (202 BCE): Hannibal orders his Punic horsemen (Cavalry) to retreat when engaged the Roman (Cavalry) and Numidian (Light Horse) horse so as to draw them away from the battlefield and give him a chance to win a purely infantry engagement.

Viking Raids (9th Century): Before they began conquering entire provinces and even countries, the Vikings rarely fought battles unless they got caught heading for their ships after a raid. These engagements required the Vikings (Blade or Light Blade) to make fighting retreats, sometimes over a considerable distance, while closely engaged.

Hastings (1066): William the Conqueror has his knights deliberately retreat from combat with Harold Godwinson’s Saxon fyrd in order to tempt them down from the crest of Caldbec Hill.

St. Aubin-le-Cauf (1053): While Hastings was the most famous instance of knights retreating from combat to tempt an enemy pursuit, it was hardly the first. Norman knights had already used the tactic against the French at this battle thirteen years earlier.

Messina (1061): Norman knights commanded by Roger d’Hautville – brother of Robert Guiscard -- employed the tactic against the Muslims in Sicily five years before Hastings.

Cassel (1071): Pretender Robert the Frisian used a deliberate retreat by his knights to help defeat his nephew, Arnulf III, Duke of Flanders.

Falkirk (1298): Edward I orders his knights to retreat from a vain attempt to break William Wallace’s schiltrons in order to give his archers a clear shot at the Scots.

Bannockburn (1314): Robert the Bruce orders his Islemen allies (Blade) to retreat back into their prepared defenses after having left them to attack recoiling British knights.

Faughart (1318): During Edward Bruce’s invasion of Ireland, his Irish allies advised him to avoid open battle with a larger Anglo-Irish army and instead to use their preferred tactics, saying “For our manner is, of this land, to follow and fight and fight fleand [i.e., while retreating].” That is, in Ireland most battles were fought as pursuits and retreats of raiding armies that comprised noble light horse, Kern (Auxilia and Psiloi), and Galloglass (Blade) that often formed the retreating side’s rearguard. Thus, as a matter of course, the galloglass had to be constantly breaking off from the faster enemy troops that led the pursuit.

Neuss (1475): Charles the Bold orders his Burgundian knights to retreat from assaulting a fortified camp in order to draw their Imperialist enemies commanded by Emperor Frederick III of Hapsburg out from behind its defenses.

Zulu Wars (1800s): Fighting retreats are attested to in a variety of battles both before and after the formation of the consolidated Zulu nation by Dingiswayo and Shaka. These engagements involved troops that would be classified as Psiloi, Auxilia and Warband.

We could argue and debate the details of individual engagements ad infinitum, but it seems beyond dispute that engaged troops should be able to retreat. The details of how this was done in each case is an interesting question, but hardly relevant for the simple, generic mechanics of DBA. My personal guess would be that elements “in contact” were not necessarily fighting each other all the time -- that bouts of intense fighting were interspersed with lulls when the two sides would back off literally just a few yards to get their breath back. During such lulls, one side or the other could back away and the scuffle would resume only if their opponents made a conscious decision follow.

Other solutions to simulating ordered retreats from combat are possible. A player might, for example, be able to stipulate beforehand that an element would recoil even if it won or tied with its opponent (perhaps even surrendering the opportunity to recoil or kill the opponent). Maybe if the opposing element had the same or greater movement distance, it could choose to pursue the voluntarily recoiling element. Yet, any such solution is bound to be complicated and could have God only knows what unintended consequences. Going back to the breaking off rules we’ve played with for two decades would be far simpler and carry no such danger.

I therefore propose that the GMlist consider eliminating the 2.2+ rules change that an element must be faster than its opponent in order to break off from close combat. Retreating is a fundamental tactical option that DBA players (like their historical counterparts) should always have available. Denying it to them not only lacks an historical foundation, but gives yet another advantage to faster armies that have already become considerably more powerful in 2.2+ thanks to its faster movement distances and standard 30” boards.

[michael guth]

In no case that you cite did the troops actually break off from close combat. So, I think you've proven the opposite point. Examples of breaking off from close combat would include, IMO Norman knights at Hastings, and TYW Swedish and Imperialist cavalry after what Guthrie called 'bounce' charges.

I have no skin in the game on the subject, but I still think that attempting to back up while in hand to hand combat on foot with an enemy to the front is a virtually sure way to get bowled over and overrun. Try reenacting it sometime with some friends with shields pushing against each other. Hooligan Soccer fan studies though show that the hooligans, ie the warbands, could break off from police armed with large shields who had closed ranks, if the police were not moving forward.

There is an example of infantry in the ECW mutually breaking off and then returning to long range firing.

So, I would assert that the ability to break off depends on the fighting posture of the two opponents, which might not be easy to model in the DBA world......

[Tony Aguilar]

This could in fact already be modeled by an element being recoiled and the on the owner's bound spend a pip to move the unit away from the previously engaged enemy.

[Rich Gause]

Throw in the difficulty of determining what is a recoil vs a breakoff vs backing up before contact or after recoil, and the fact that you have to break off by backing up three MU in 2.2+ and the fact that historical examples don't have the action divided into alternating player bounds and I would not say there is anything conclusively supporting the idea that anybody should be able to break off from anybody. Also they game plays better with the current rules IMO.

[winterbadger]

That's a considerable accumulation of examples, Kevin. Good on you for taking the time and trouble to assemble it.

While I don't think that all of those cases are clear enough to be arguments for breakoff only from faster vs. breakoff from any, I think there are enough to show that *some* breakoffs did take place and so breaking off should be permissible in *some* form.

The other thing that it reminds us is that a *limited* number of disciplined troops over the millenia have been adept enough to break off from the enemy *and* lure them forward. The problem with trying to reflect that is defining exactly who has that ability and where it appears. It's a great deal more selective than simply being attached to DBA troop types. Different actions described by different authors vary between whether a withdrawal was planned or merely fortuitous. Sometimes troops in one part of the army get special training that identical troops in another part don't, and that makes the difference. I think that feigned flight is, alas, another feature that is best used in scenario design than incorporated into a set of rules generically. We have the impetuous advance, which applies to break-offs as well as withdrawals, but if the withdrawal of the Cartho center at Cannae was really a trap (rather than a happy accident promoting an otherwise able plan of envelopment), then we'd have to add Blade or Spear to the list of troops that advance impetuously. No, I think that goes in the "too hard" pile.

One thing I would caution against is stating, on the basis of 14-15 examples, some of them very vague and lacking in detail, that what you are contesting "lacks an historical foundation". That sort of overbroad claim weakens your case. JMO, YMMV.

[winterbadger]

Originally Posted by michael guth

I have no skin in the game on the subject, but I still think that attempting to back up while in hand to hand combat on foot with an enemy to the front is a virtually sure way to get bowled over and overrun.

But I think you are assuming a *specific type* of "close combat"; it sounds like you're envisioning all close combat being the equivalent of heavy infantry hand to hand combat. Not even all heavy infantry close combat is going to be hand to hand, much less all the other type of close combat that exist in DBA (skirmishers tossing javelins, horse riding up to within a few dozen yards of foot and filling them with arrows before riding away).

Originally Posted by michael guth

Try reenacting it sometime with some friends with shields pushing against each other. Hooligan Soccer fan studies though show that the hooligans, ie the warbands, could break off from police armed with large shields who had closed ranks, if the police were not moving forward.

As someone who has done a lot of full-contact hand to hand combat (many years ago), I would caution against using the evidence of "me and my friends in the backyard" for anything. It's all great fun, but it's none of it real combat.

And I think that one of the biggest mistakes of military historians is equating mob violence with armed combat. Studies of hooligan violence against police tell us--maybe--what Hd do against Bd. They don't tell us anything about the fighting styles of ancient or medieval warriors, and IMNSHO, trying to pretend they do is like running down a blind alley with one's head in a bag.

[Chris Brantley]

Originally Posted by winterbadger

And I think that one of the biggest mistakes of military historians is equating mob violence with armed combat. Studies of hooligan violence against police tell us--maybe--what Hd do against Bd. They don't tell us anything about the fighting styles of ancient or medieval warriors, and IMNSHO, trying to pretend they do is like running down a blind alley with one's head in a bag.

Whereas I look to LOTRO PVP (technically PVMP) to inform my views of individual and small unit behavior in melee combat.

[Pavane]

Thanks for the research Kevin. You are a credit to the DBA community. As others have pointed out, it is not necessarily conclusive as it may have occurred after a "recoil result". Colin Rice, whose opinion I respect, agrees with you so I owe you guys a second review.

I'm not sure that an element should be able to disengage from combat in all cases. To me the 2.2+ approach is the most conservative interpretation: not never, not always.

[michael guth]

I disagree with you 100%. If professional military historians conclude that mob violence can inform our view on ancient combat then I am inclined to listen. I do also see value in reenactment, of course there are many levels of and styles of reenactment. Larping with magic dust does not do much for me. Full metal jousting though is very interesting.

[michael guth]

The view that close infantry combat is something other than continuous hand to hand combat is exactly one of the conclusions from the study of mob violence, by the very historians you claim have their heads in bags. Inconsistent....